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Abstract: The democratic development of a specific society implies the pluralism of ideas and 
conceptions about the world and life, about social organization, about the relations between the 
members of the society. As social beings, people need to receive ideas and information and to express, 
in any form possible, their own ideas and conceptions. That is why the right to freedom of expression 
and implicitly the freedom of press is a component guaranteed by the international legal documents in 
the matters of human rights.  
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The freedom of expression or freedom of speech is considered to be the most 
powerful weapon for the defense of the persons’ rights and liberties against the 
antidemocratic manifestations (I.R.D.O., 1994, p. 37). 
As shown in the doctrine (Bârsan, 2001, p. 10), “one cannot conceive progress in 
the scientific, cultural or artistic domains without the existence of freedom of 
expression beyond any state frontier…” 
Freedom of expression is settled both in the reference international legal documents 
in the matter of human rights, and in the Constitutions of the individual states. From 
the regulations comprised in the international legal instruments in the matter of 
human rights, and from the dispositions contained in the constitutions of certain 
countries, one remarks that freedom of expression is designated by means of 
different denominations. 
In article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights and art.11 of the 
European Union’s Chart of Fundamental Rights they are entitled “freedom of 
expression”, and the same denomination is used in the Constitutions of Romania 
(art. 30), Germany (art. 5), Japan (art. 21) or Denmark (art. 77). We must point out 
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that, although art. 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights and art. 11 of 
the European Union’s Chart of Fundamental Rights use the name of freedom of 
expression, in the content of the regulation expressed by these articles one speaks 
about the “right to the freedom of expression / speech”. The same term is used in the 
content of the regulations  contained in: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(art. 19), the International Pact regarding the Civil and Political Rights (art. 19), the 
American Convention of Human Rights of San Jose (art. 13), the Islamic Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (chapter XII, letter a). 
Other instruments refer neither to the freedom of expression nor the right to the 
freedom of expression, but define this right through its components, i.e. freedom of 
speech and freedom of the press (The Constitution of the USA – The First 
Amendment, the Bill of Rights – document with constitutional value of Great 
Britain). 
From the content of the international and constitutional regulations it results thus 
that freedom of expression is consecrated either under this name, or under the name 
of right to freedom of expression, or under the names of some of its aspects: 
freedom of speech and freedom of the press. One uses both notions, the notion of 
right, as well as the notion of freedom, freedom of expression being a right and a 
liberty at the same time, as long as the majority opinion in the legal literature is in 
the sense of the equivalence of the two notions. As regards the content of freedom of 
expression comprised in the international and constitutional settlements, we remark 
that this is different too. 
Consequently, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Pact 
regarding Civil and Political Rights, in art. 10 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights, art. 11 in the European Union’s Chart of Fundamental Rights, the 
American Convention of Human Rights of San Jose, the Declaration of Fundamental 
Duties of Asian Peoples and States, the Islamic Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, freedom of expression expressly contains the freedom of opinion and the 
freedom of information. The same content of freedom of speech is found also in the 
regulation given to this right in the Constitution of Switzerland, for instance. 
Certain regulations (the Bill of Rights expressly includes in the content of freedom 
of expression only freedom of speech or freedom of opinion, the freedom of 
information being settled as separate right, as well as the freedom of the press 
(Constitution of Romania). Other regulations expressly include in the content of 
freedom of expression, beside the freedom of opinion and information or the 
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freedom of speech, the freedom of the press (Constitution of the USA – The First 
Amendment, Constitution of Germany, of Japan, of Russia). 
Part of the aforementioned international and constitutional legal documents, 
although they do not expressly stipulate in the content of their regulations the 
freedom of the press as component of freedom of expression, still refer to it. For 
instance, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Pact 
regarding Civil and Political Rights refer, in the content of the regulation regarding 
the freedom of expression, to the dissemination of information in printed form, 
whereas the European Unions’ Chart of Fundamental Rights speak about the 
freedom and pluralism of the mass media information, and the situation is the same 
in the case of certain constitutional dispositions (for example: the Constitution of 
France, the Constitution of Romania). 
From the regulations analyzed above we may draw the conclusion that freedom of 
expression is a right with a complex content. In our opinion, the freedom of 
expression comprises within its content three other freedoms: freedom of opinion, 
freedom of information and freedom of the press, these three liberties being 
interdependent and unable to manifest one in the absence of the other. 
As we have already pointed out, we consider the freedom of the press is a 
component of freedom of expression, with the mention that, when we refer to the 
press, we refer to the media in general, i.e. both the written press and the spoken 
one.  
The analysis of freedom of the press as component of freedom of expression, in our 
opinion., should be considered in relation with matters connected to the journalists’ 
freedom of expression, to the liberty to create publications, to the broadcast liberties 
and the liberty to broadcast radio and TV shows, in the context in which this 
freedom is not clearly defined in the content of the international regulations in the 
matter of freedom of expression. 
Nevertheless, from the international regulations in the matter and from certain 
constitutional dispositions, as well as from the jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights we may deduce that the freedom of the press, as component of the 
freedom of expression, refers to the above-listed aspects. 
The press has a special role in the present-day societies characterized, in the words 
of the constitutionalist Louis Favoreau, by “the convergence of political liberalism, 
of democracy and of the lawful state” (Favoreau, 2000, p. 91). The position of the 
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press in a society is determined by the very fact that, naturally, at its foundation, it 
aims at  promoting the general interests of the civil society. From this perspective 
the press has, first of all, a central political role (Dănişor, 1997, p. 101). 
Beyond the political part it plays, the press occupies a central place in the 
functioning of a true pluralism of ideas at the social level (Răduleţu, 2002, p. 21). 
The progress of a society cannot be conceived without the manifestation of a real 
competition in all domains of activities, first of all within the debates of ideas. Or the 
press represents the appropriate place for such debates. A limitation of its freedom 
would affect the very development of the respective society.  
In fact, the importance of the press in a democratic society has been constantly 
recognized by the European Court of Human Rights in its jurisprudence. The Court 
justly remarked that the freedom of the press offer the public opinion one of the best 
means of knowing and judging the ideas and attitudes of rulers, and more generally 
the free game of political debates, which lies at the very core of the notion of 
democratic society1. The Court stated that the press has the role of “watchdog” in a 
democratic society, the freedom of the press being one of the characteristic traits of 
the democratic health of a state 2. The freedom of the press is so important that the 
Court recognizes that the journalistic liberty also includes the possible appeal to a 
certain dose of exaggeration or provocation 3. 
The European Court of Human Rights, through its jurisprudence, has set also the 
landmarks to be considered when analyzing the freedom of the press, as component 
of the freedom of expression. 
A first issue related to the freedom of expression through the press regards the 
protection of the journalists’ sources, an extremely thorny problem that 
investigation journalists often have to face. 
For instance, in the case Goodwin vs. The United Kingdom4, the European Court of 
Human Rights stated that the protection of sources represents one of the foundation 
bricks of the press freedom, the absence of this protection risking to discourage 
“informers” to help the press inform the public about general interest matters; 
consequently, a judicial ordinance that would rule the revealing of the journalists' 
                                                 
1
 ECHR, decision of 8 July 1986, pronounced in the case Lingens vs. Austria. 
2
 ECHR ( the Great Chamber), decision of 26 November 1991 pronounced in the case Observer and 
Guardian vs. The United Kingdom. 
3
 ECHR decision of 26 April 1995 pronounced in the case Praeger and Oberlischlick vs. Austria. 
4
 ECHR decision of 27 March 1996 pronounced in the case Goodwin vs.  The United Kingdom. 
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sources could be reconciled with art.10 of the Convention only if it is justified by an 
imperative of preponderantly public interest. Consequently the protection of 
journalists' sources is guaranteed, but not unlimited, the more so as anyone invoking 
the freedom of expression also assumes duties and liabilities related to the rights of 
others (Renucci, 2009, p. 190). 
The issue of the protection of journalists’ sources is settled at the international level 
through the legal instruments regarding the journalists’ rights (The Resolution 
adopted at the 4th European Ministries’ Conference on the mass media policy held in 
Prague on 7-8 December 1994, the Resolution of the European Parliament regarding 
the non-revealing of journalists’ information sources adopted on 18 January 1998), 
but also in the national legislation, through the current ethics codes in numerous 
states. Moreover, keeping in mind the jurisprudence of the European Court  reflected 
in the case Goodwin vs. the United Kingdom, at the European Community, the 
Ministries’ Committee adopted on 8 March 2000, the Recommendation no. R (2000) 
7 on the right of journalists not to disclose their sources of information. 
The regulation contained in this last document was mostly taken over in the 
Romanian legislation in the matter, i.e. in Law no. 504/2002 regarding the audio-
visual – the frame law in the matter. 
Thus, art. 7 par.1 of Law no. 504/2002 is dedicated to the guarantee of the 
confidential character of the information sources used in conceiving or elaborating 
news, shows, programs or other elements of broadcasting service. The enumeration 
of the “data able to identify a source” (name and personal details, as well as the 
voice or image of a source; the concrete circumstances of obtaining the information 
from a source by the journalist; the unpublished part of the information supplied by 
a source; the personal details of the journalists and their employer in relation with 
their professional activity) is taken from the resolution of the above-mentioned 
Ministries’ Resolution. 
We remark from the regulation contained in par. 2 of art. 7 of Law no. 504/2002 that 
the journalist is exempted to reveal his or her information sources only if the 
information thus obtained is in direct connection with his or her professional 
activity, the text does not expressly stipulate that the protection of the sources might 
take place also if the information is obtained by the journalist indirectly or 
accidentally. On the other hand we may also see that, in the absence of express rules, 
the interpretation of the statement “direct connection with the professional activity” 
and the establishment of such a connection is left to the latitude of the court of law, 
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that, in accordance with the regulations of par. 6, art. 7 has to decide upon the 
necessity to reveal the sources, in the situations expressly and limitatively provided 
in the same regulation (the defence of public order, of national security, the 
necessity of solving a cause deduced to trial). 
This regulation is debatable under the aspect of the requirements of clarity and 
predictability of the law, affirmed by the European Court and its jurisprudence.  
In relation with the protection of sources, we should mention that in a case1, the 
European Court appreciated as an infringement of art. 10 of the Convention the 
searches affected against certain journalists at their place of work. In that case, the 
Court rules that the searches against the claimants meant to discover the information 
sources used by the journalists – although remained without concrete results – 
represent an act more serious that a legal summation asking to divulge the source. In 
this context, the Court considered that the searches effected against the journalist 
claimant at his place of work “affect more the protection of the sources” than the 
judicial obligation to reveal them. 
The protection of journalists’ sources, as seen by the European Contentious Court of 
Human Rights, is quasi-absolute. For instance, in the case Damman vs. 
Switzerland2, the European judges found an infringement of art. 10 regarding a 
journalist convicted for instigation to the infringement of the secret of the office; the 
Court ruled that such a condemnation constitutes a censorship modality aiming at 
inciting the journalists to not perform research activities inherent to their job, which 
risks to discourage them to contribute to the public debate of the issues interesting 
the community. This, in the opinion of Strasbourg judges, risks hindering the press 
in the fulfilment of its mission of information and control. Consequently there is no 
freedom of the press without the protection of its sources. 
Another problem raised in connection with the freedom of the press as component of 
the freedom of expression refers to its relation with the limit of the admissible 
criticism when it comes to public personalities, people in public office or 
magistrates, or the protection of the reputation of rights of the other citizens 
(Renucci, 2009, p. 200).   
It is extremely important to identify the position of the Court of Strasbourg in the 
appreciation of these relations. 
                                                 
1
 ECHR decision of 5 February 2003 pronounced in the case Roemen and Schmit vs. Luxembourg. 
2
 ECHR decision of 25 April 2006 pronounced in the case Damman vs.  Switzerland. 
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As regards the political field, the European Court stated that the limits of admissible 
criticism within the freedom of expression are wider when they are focused upon 
certain actions of the government, as its actions are also under the control of public 
opinion1; similarly, the limits of admissible criticism are wider when applied to a 
political figure acting in his or her capacity of public persona, than in the case of a 
private person, nevertheless the former is not deprived of the right to the protection 
of his/her reputation and dignity within private life and outside it2. A relevant case in 
this respect is Lingens vs.  Austria, which referred to the penal condemnation of a 
journalist for slander, for his affirmations regarding the former Austrian federal 
chancellor Bruno Kreiski.  
In this case the Court made an important distinction between “facts” and “value 
judgments”. According to the Court ruling, “The existence of the facts can be 
proved, whereas the truth of value judgments is not susceptible to be proved”3. The 
Court appreciated that the fact the claimant was asked, in order to avoid being 
convicted, to prove the truth of his assertions (that the Court considered judgments 
of value) constitutes an infringement of art.10 of the Convention. 
In the case of public clerks or persons in public office, the Court also appreciated 
that the limits of the admissible criticism against them are wider than those of the 
criticism against private persons. However, the Court considered that public clerks 
cannot be treated exactly like politicians, because, unlike the latter, who are aware 
they are exposed to a close scrutiny of all their assertions and acts, control 
performed especially by the press, the persons in public office need the trust of 
public opinion in order to adequately fulfil their tasks, and it is thus necessary to be 
protected from the verbal attacks against them (Decision of 29 March 2001 in the 
case Thoma vs. Luxembourg, decision of 27 May 2004 pronounced in the case 
Rizos and Dastkos vs. Greece) (Tudorică & Bogdan, 2005, p. 297). 
                                                 
1
 ECHR decision of 30 January 1998 pronounced in the case party of United Communists of Turkey et 
al., vs.  Turkey. 
2
 ECHR decision of 8 July 1986, pronounced in the case Lingens vs. Austria. 
3
 The distinction was taken over in all the ulterior cases, for instance: ECHR, The Decision of the Great 
Chamber  of 17 December 2004 pronounced in the case Cumpănă andi Mazăre vs. Romania; ECHR, 
decision of inadmissibility of 21 September 2004 pronounced in the case Abeberry vs. France; ECHR, 
decision of 24 February 1997 pronounced in the case De Haes and Gijsels vs.  Belgium. 
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An assessment criterion utilized by the Court for the admissible criticism is that of 
inscribing the critical assertions within a debate of general interest carried out in the 
press1.  
As regards the administration of justice, the Strasbourg Court pointed out that the 
press must inform the public opinion about the functioning of justice – essential 
institution in a democratic society – as it is an issue of general interest. Nevertheless, 
as the European judges ruled, the action of the judicial power needs the confidence 
of citizens in order to prosper, and it is essential to assure it protection against 
devastating attacks, lacking serious grounds, the more so as the obligation of reserve 
of the magistrates prevents them from reacting2. However the Court appreciated that 
the freedom of the press in a democratic society is so important that this can justify 
to a certain extent the questioning of the authority and impartiality of justice in a 
polemic, even aggressive tone3. Two further aspects related to the freedom of the 
press as component of freedom of expression are linked to the founding of 
publications and the regime of authorization in the audio-visual domain.  
In the international regulations in the matter there is no express provision of what 
the freedom of the press consists of, i.e. if this liberty supposes also the right to 
found publications. However, the constitutional regulations of different states 
comprise referrals to this right. For instance, art.30 of the Romanian Constitution 
settling the freedom of expression, in par.3 stipulating the freedom of the press 
implies also the freedom to found publications, thus consecrating the right to 
establish publications. Par.4 of the same article forbids the suppression of 
publications, without referring to the interdiction of suspending publications, 
sanction that, in the absence of contrary dispositions, is allowed. 
We may remark that in Romania there is no law of the press yet that stipulates in 
detail the manner to found publications and the cases that make applicable the 
sanction of suspending a publication, which is questionable. 
As for the regime of authorization in the audio-visual field, we mention that in this 
respect, art.10, part.1 final thesis of the European Convention of Human Rights 
stipulates that the dispositions of paragraph 1 first thesis of the same article, which 
settles the freedom of expression, does not prevent states from subjecting the 
radiobroadcast companies, cinemas and televisions to a regime of authorization. In 
                                                 
1
 ECHR decision of 25 June 1992, pronounced in the case Thorgeirson vs.  Iceland. 
2
 ECHR decision of 26 April 1995 pronounced in the case Oberschlick vs. Austria. 
3
 ECHR decision of 24 February 1997 pronounced in the case De Haes and Gijels vs. Belgium. 
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our legislation, we find referrals regarding the authorization of the radio and 
television stations in par.5 of art.31 of the Romanian Constitution and in the Audio-
visual Law no. 504/2002 with the ulterior alterations. 
From the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights with incidence in the 
matter we may extract several principles. A first principle established through the 
jurisdiction of the Court is that the national authorities have the competence to settle 
the system of authorisation in the audio-visual field without this competence 
hindering the freedom of expression. As the European Court stated in the case 
Groppera vs. Switzerland1, the authorization clause provided in the third sentence of 
part.1 of art.10 in the Convention, to the extent that it constitutes an exception from 
the principle of freedom of expression proclaimed by art.10, has a reduced 
application scope. It aims at allowing the subjecting the audio-visual broadcasting 
media to an authorisation regime, especially in relation with the technical aspects. 
However the respective authorisation measures should in their turn observe the 
guarantees instituted by the second paragraph of art.10. 
Moreover, the Court stated also that the states have the right to adopt one legislation 
able to assure the observance of the authorisation regime; in this respect, in 1986, 
the Commission declared inadmissible a complaint of the representatives of a radio 
station that had broadcast without a prior authorisation required by the Flemish 
community of Belgium. In that case, the Commission considered that “as a state may 
adopt the legislation meant to subject the radio broadcasting companies to a regime 
of authorisation, it should also be legal for the state to adopt a legislation meant to 
assure the observance of the respective regime, especially through measures meant 
to prevent the avoidance of the authorisation terms2.   
The Court established also that art.10 of the Convention does not guarantee the radio 
broadcasters a right of licence, however the states do not have an unlimited range of 
appreciation as regards the authorisation regime. In the Decision of 16 October 1986 
pronounced din the case Verein Alternatires Lokalradio and Verein Radio 
Dreyeckland Basel vs. Switzerland, the former Commission ruled that the rejection 
by the state of an authorisation application should not be manifestly arbitrary or 
biased and thus contrary to the principles stipulated in the preamble of the 
convention and the rights it guarantees. For this reason, an authorisation regime not 
observing the requirements of pluralism, of tolerance and of a spirit without which 
                                                 
1
 ECHR decision of 28 March 1990 pronounced in the case Groppera Radio AG et al. vs. Switzerland. 
2
 European Commission for Human Rights, decision of 5 March 1986 pronounced in the case X et al. 
vs. Belgium. 
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no democratic society can exist, breaches art.10 par.1 in the Convention (Nicolae, p. 
78). 
A last aspect clarified by the jurisprudence of the Court regarding the authorisation 
regime in the audio-visual domain refers to the public monopolies in the matter of 
audio-visual mass media. The public monopolies in this filed were considered by the 
Court as susceptible to infringe the provisions of art.10, especially as they do not 
assure the plurality of the sources of information.  The Court appreciated that such a 
monopoly is not necessary in a democratic society and that, anyway, in modern 
societies, the multiplication of the methods of broadcasting and development of 
trans-national televisions makes it impossible to justify the existence of 
monopolies1.  
Finally, a last issue related to the freedom of the press is focused upon its relation to 
the protection of reputation and rights of others. In this respect the European Court 
does not hesitate, for instance, to grant pre-eminence to the freedom of the press in 
relation with the rights of citizens to be protected against racial discrimination2 or in 
relation with the rights of their fellow citizens to benefit from the presumption of 
innocence 3. 
As a conclusion of the above analysis, the freedom of the press, as component of the 
freedom of expression, is an essential freedom related to the very nature of a 
democratic society. It assures the free debate of information and ideas, grace to the 
pluralism of the sources of information it offers. The exercise of the freedom of the 
press also contains obligations and liabilities, which are circumscribed to the limits 
the freedom of expression bears in its exercise.  
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